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Abstract: The paper discusses an experience in using UML and two complementary verification 
tools in the framework of SAFECAST, a project on secured group communication systems design. 
AVISPA enabled detecting and fixing security flaws. The TURTLE toolkit enabled saving 
development time by eliminating design solutions with inappropriate temporal parameters. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Secured group communication systems, or SGC for short, implement group 
management functions and communication services. The complexity level 
reached by SGCs has stimulated research work on dedicated modelling and 
formal verification techniques. The Unified Modelling Language (UML) enables 
system formalization and opens new avenues for formal verification of SGC 
models against security flaws and timing errors. 
The paper shares an experience in joint application of UML and formal 
verification tools to SGC design. The SGC is modelled using an extended UML 
that contains sufficient information to derive two formal models in HLPSL (High 
Level Protocol Specification Language [1]) and TURTLE (Timed UML and RT-
LOTOS Environment [2]), respectively. The AVISPA [1] tool uses the Dolev-Yao 
intruder model [3] to detect security flaws. The TURTLE toolkit, or TTool for 
short [4], checks TURTLE models against temporal requirements. The SGC 
protocol designed in the framework of SAFECAST project [5] serves as running 
example throughout the paper. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section II defines a UML method that captures 
requirements using SysML requirement diagrams, and extends UML to achieve 
use-case driven analysis and object-oriented design. Section III introduces 
requirement, analysis and design patterns that apply to a broad variety of SGCs. 
Section IV presents the UML model of the SAFECAST SGC. The latter is 
hierarchically organized, and consequently members may be upgraded or 
downgraded. Section V addresses the Upgrade service and discusses the benefits 
of using two complementary verification tools (AVISPA and TURTLE). Section 
VI surveys related work. Section VII concludes the paper. 
II. UML METHOD 
The UML standard defines a notation, not a method. The paper promotes the use 
of verification-centric methods that enable early detection of design errors. The 
purpose is not to cover the entire design trajectory from requirement capture to 
maintenance, but to emphasize on the early stages of that trajectory. 
A. Overview 
The OMG-based UML does not provide any diagram to capture requirements. 
The method depicted by Figure 1 imports SysML requirement diagrams. In 
SysML, requirements remain informal, which hampers formal checking of design 
models against user or system requirements. The solution proposed for SGC 
design is to include logic formulas and chronograms into requirement diagrams in 
order to formalize security and temporal requirements, respectively.  
Use-case driven analysis enables to specify the system by its boundary, the set of 
actors it interacts with, and the function or services it is expected to provide. Use-
cases are documented by scenarios expressed in terms of sequence diagrams. 
Analysis diagrams contain annotations that contribute to achieve security and 
temporal requirement traceability. 
Object-oriented design enables to model the system’s architecture. An active class 
has a behaviour described by a state-machine which contains security and real-
time information. The UML model gives sufficient information to derive HLPSL 
and TURTLE codes, and therefore to cater the AVISPA and TTool, respectively. 
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Figure 1. A UML method including formal verification 
B. Security-oriented verification with AVISPA 
The AVISPA [1] tool checks Internet security-sensitive protocols against security 
flaws. AVISPA accepts a problem specification and a property specification. Both 
are expressed in HLPSL, which describes each participant by a basic role and 
composes roles to represent scenarios. A HLPSL specification is converted to an 
intermediate form that is accepted by all back-ends of AVISPA. The Constraint-
Logic-based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe) backend verifies security properties, such 
as secrecy, authentication, fairness, and non-repudiation. Security properties may 
be expressed as linear logical formulas or algebraic properties. Rewriting and 
constraint solving techniques enable attack detection. 
C. Temporal verification with TTool 
TURTLE belongs to the family of real-time UML profiles that bridge the gap 
between the UML and formal methods worlds. The TURTLE toolkit offers a user-
friendly interface to formal verification tools and supports a verification-centric 
method for distributed real-time system design. Formal code generators for Real-
Time LOTOS (RTL), Construction and Analysis of Distributed Processes (CADP) 
and UPPAAL allow one to access verification techniques such as timed 
reachability analysis, transition system minimization and model checking of logic 
formulas. A Java code generator enables rapid prototyping of systems whose 
model includes component and deployment diagrams in addition to the 
requirement capture, analysis and design ones. 
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III. PATTERNS FOR SGCS 
The benefits of using patterns have regularly been acknowledged in the literature. 
This section introduces patterns dedicated to a broad variety of SGCs, including 
situations where groups are hierarchically organized. The patterns nevertheless 
focus on two major functions: security algorithms that use keys and group 
management. 
A. Requirement capture pattern 
The requirement diagram pattern depicted by Figure 2 categorizes requirements in 
two groups (see the two <<deriveReqt>> links in the upper part of the figure). The 
term “general properties” denotes a set of properties that almost of systems should 
satisfy. Other properties are specific to the studied system. Figure 2 focuses on 
security and temporal requirements. For space reasons, blocks whose name ends 
with an “s” (e.g. SecurityRequiments) are not refined. 
 
Figure 2. Requirement diagram pattern 
B. Analysis pattern 
SGCs commonly use security keys. The pattern in Figure 3 identifies key creation, 
distribution and renewal services. 
SGCs also manage groups. The pattern in Figure 4 presents services that allow 
one person to join a group (Join), to leave a group upon request (Leave), to leave a 
group after an exclusion (Exclude), and to reenter the group (Reinstal). 
When the group is hierarchically organized, one member moves up and down in 
the hierarchy using the Upgrade and Downgrade services, respectively. 
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 Figure 3. Analysis pattern for key management 
 
Figure 4. Pattern for group management 
C. Design pattern 
It is common practice in protocol design to define a 3-layer architecture where the 
protocol entities in the central layer rely on some pre-existing communication 
service to render in turn a value-added service to their upper users. The pattern in 
Figure 5 extends that principle to SGCs and splits the protocol layer into two sub-
layers. GMM and GCKM respectively implement group management and group 
communication functions. 
 
Figure 5. Architectural pattern 
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IV. SAFECAST SYSTEM MODELLING 
A. The SAFECAST system 
The secured group communication protocol designed in the framework of 
SAFECAST project manages hierarchically organized group of policemen, 
firemen and military men that work together on the same operation theatre. Each 
group member owns a mobile phone, and talks to others using the PMR 
technology (Private Mobile Radio). The protocol secures communication and 
manages newly created groups of Humans in a way that preserves the original 
hierarchies of the original groups of policemen, firemen and military men. The 
groups are not only hierarchical but also dynamic, since receivers may join or 
leave groups at any time. Last but not least, security requirements may not be 
dissociated from temporal ones.  
 
B. Security and temporal requirements 
Security requirements essentially address integrity and confidentiality issues 
(Table 1). On the other hand, temporal requirements mainly relate to maximum 
response delays. 
 Security Temporal 
Group - Group member 
authentication 
- Confidentiality before and 
after adhesion 
- Fighting against collusion 
- Node losses tolerance 
- Group 
access 
delay 
 
Interaction - Message confidentiality 
before/after member 
adhesion/departure 
- Traffic encryption keys 
confidentiality before/after 
member adhesion/departure 
 
Communication - Confidentiality and 
integrity of messages 
- Confidentiality and 
integrity of the traffic 
encryption keys 
- Message authentication 
- Replay avoidance 
- Propagation 
delay 
- Throughput 
- Jitter 
Table 1. Hierarchical Group Key Management Protocol requirements 
C. Key management services 
The use-case diagram in Figure 6 identifies several functions that achieve 
communication key renewal. RenewHierarchicalKey applies to a group whose 
members are hierarchically linked. The use-case includes two use-cases named 
DistributeHierarchicalKey (DHK) and DistributePlaneKey (DPK). DHK allows 
one chief to send his/her key to one group member that is responsible for his/her 
hierarchical level. DPK allows each responsible member to send a session key to 
all members belonging to its hierarchical level. DHK and DPK both use 
DistributeKey. 
The keys have to be renewed on a regular basis. The diagram in Figure 6 thus 
contains the RenewBasePeriodKey use-cases. 
 
Figure 6. Security mechanism management services 
D. Group management services 
The use-case diagram in Figure 7 identifies a set of services that enable changes 
inside one group. 
 Join and Leave allow one member to enter and exit a group, respectively. 
 Upgrade and Downgrade services. A member has promotion when he/she 
moves from his/her current class i to an upper class j. 
 Reconnect allows a member who formerly lost connection to connect 
again. 
 ExcludeGroupMember manages member exclusion. 
 Reinstal may be invoked to reinstall a previously excluded member. 
All services but ExcludeGroupMember use the MemberConnectionMgmt 
subservice, which manages group member connections and disconnections. 
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 Figure 7. Services for group dynamics 
The next section focuses on Upgrade, a service for which we identified security 
flaws and temporal violations. 
V. UPGRADE SERVICE 
A. Overview 
The SAFECAST system manages a set of dynamic and hierarchical groups. The 
group chief is the one who decides which actions may be performed by his/her 
group members. Moving up in the hierarchy using the Upgrade service is an 
example of such actions.  
B. Requirement capture 
The Upgrade service enables a member endowed with responsibilities to leave 
his/her group (Figure 8) and to be replaced by another member um who occupied 
a lower position in the hierarchy. The group’s administrator (not necessarily the 
group’s chief) asks um to move up in the hierarchy. 
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Figure 8. Use-case diagram 
C. Use-case driven analysis 
The Upgrade protocol works as follows. Member um issues a move-up request - 
including his/her Identity Certificate CI - to the chief cm. Depending on the 
validity of the attributes of um’s Identity certificate, cm decides to accept the 
Upgrade request or not. In case of acceptance, um receives the key of the leader’s 
class (TEK) and a new group membership certificate (CAp), both encrypted under 
his or her public key pkum. After successful completion, the Upgrade service 
brings the upgraded member up to an upper hierarchical level (not necessarily the 
closest upper level). If the upgrade request is refused, a message informs um, 
which therefore stays at the same hierarchical level. The sequence diagram in 
Figure 9 depicts that scenario. For the sake of clarity, only the main attributes of 
the certificates are represented. 
 
Figure 9. Sequence diagram 
D. Design 
The design model (Figure 10) of the SAFECAST system relies on the 
architectural pattern that is depicted by Figure 5. 
 
Figure 10. SAFECAST system design model 
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Figure 11. UpgradeMemberCom behaviour 
Figure 11 depicts a fragment of the state machine used to implement the Upgrade 
service. Of particular interest are the tempo primitive and the security requirement 
starting with secret. 
The above state machine is one among the design model elements from which 
formal code is derived to cater the AVISPA and TURTLE toolkits. 
E. Security flaws detection using AVISPA 
(1) um  cm : SeqNumum, {Hash1}pk-1(um), CI (um) 
Hash1 is the digest of the message SeqNumum 
 (2) cm  um: SeqNumcm, {TEKj, CAp(um)}pkum, {Hash2}pk-1(cm), 
CI (um) 
Hash2 is the digest of the message SeqNumcm, {TEKj, CAp(um)}pkum 
Figure 12. AVISPA code derived from the model 
A security flaw was found in the scenario attack described in Figure 12, step (1). 
It conforms to the “Man in the Middle” paradigm. It results from playing a single 
session between the um and cm members. The intruder i starts executing the 
protocol with um. um sends his/her identity certificate. The certificate is divided 
into an encrypted part and a part in clear. Therefore, the intruder can intercept the 
message and get the public key of um. Then, the intruder sends the intercepted 
message to the chief cm who gets the public key pk and uses it to encrypt the 
group key TEKj as well as the new group membership certificate CAp. Finally, the 
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intruder uses the encrypting key to create a message similar to the one awaited by 
um. Also, it forces the participant um to take as group key any key not coming 
from cm, but composed by the intruder. None of the members is able to directly 
communicate with the other member, but the intruder is able to decrypt any 
message sent by any of them. Moreover, the intruder has the ability to become a 
communication relay between the two members. 
The attack was fixed by adding a signature of the message (Figure 12, step (2)), 
using the private key of cm. Thus, um can authenticate the source of the message 
and extract the valid class key TEKj. A sequence number is introduced in each 
message in order to avoid replay attacks. 
AVISPA enabled detection of other non trivial flaws, in particular confidentiality 
violation. Dealing with reinstallation of a former member, AVISPA demonstrates 
that an intruder was able to access to information private to the group. The 
Reinstallation sub-protocol was fixed in [6]. 
F. Temporal verification using TURTLE 
The reader may ask himself or herself whether the fixed version of the Upgrade 
protocol verified by AVISPA meets its expected deadlines or not. Formal 
verification using the TURTLE toolkit enabled comparing two configurations 
with a low-rate PMR at 6 kb/s with a 3 kms range and an average-rate PMR at 
100 kb/s value with a 100 kms range, respectively. 
Formal verification identified four temporal requirements met for an average-rate 
PMR (Table 2), but unmet for a low-rate PMR. A concrete benefit of formal 
verification using the TURTLE toolkit was to save development time: it was 
decided to not develop the SAFECAST SGC over a low-rate PMR. 
For the middle-rate PMR network, all the services verified using TURTLE meet 
the requirements of middle-rate PMR network, but the Downgrade and Reinstall 
services. Duration of 490 ms was computed for the two services, which exceeds 
the 350 ms limit required for the “accessing to multimedia groups.” In order not to 
sacrifice the entire security procedure, it was decided to relax the “accessing to 
multimedia groups” requirement to 500 ms. 
 
 
 
12 
Requirement Limit duration 
(ms) 
Upgrade protocol on 
average-rate network 
(Execution time 331 ms) 
Detecting an integrity 
violation 
10 000 Widely validated 
Detecting a replay  
 
10 000 Widely validated 
Accessing to a 
multimedia group 
350 Shortly validated 
Accessing to textual 
message groups 
60 000 Very widely validated 
Table 2. Temporal requirements and computed time for the Upgrade service 
VI. RELATED WORK 
A. Formal automated security verification of group protocols 
The benefits of applying formal verification to security protocols have first been 
acknowledged for two- and three-party protocols. Nowadays, group protocols 
raise much more complex security problems [7] [8] [9] [10] since they involve an 
unbounded number of participants and consider some complicated security 
properties. Significant attacks on such protocols have been found using automated 
techniques. 
Taghdir and Jackson [9] modelled the multicast group key management protocol 
proposed by Tanaka and Sato [11]. They exhibited several properties not satisfied 
by the protocol and proposed an “improved” protocol whose model did not 
include any active attacker. Steel and Bundy [12] identified serious attacks in the 
so-called “improved” protocol. They used CORAL, a tool also used to discover 
attacks on the Asokan-Ginzboorg and Iolus [13] protocols. 
Work on group protocol verification systematically raises an infinite search space 
problem since even one legal execution of the protocol requires an unlimited 
number of steps. Meadows and Syverson [14] extended the NRL protocol 
analyzer in order to tackle the GDOI's protocols [8]. 
Several tools primarily designed for attack search have been extended to handle 
group protocols. Examples include algebraic primitives (e.g. XOR) and the 
exponentiation often encountered in extensions of key agreement based upon 
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Diffie-Hellman. CL-AtSe, one of the four back-ends used in AVISPA [1], is an 
example addressed in this paper. 
Tools for protocol falsification (searching for attacks) have been extended to 
handle group protocols and to cope with additional requirements, such as 
algebraic primitives and exponentiation (regularly encountered in extensions of 
Diffie-Hellman-based key agreement). These tools include CL-AtSe. Modular by 
its extensibility to new classes of protocols or requirements, and powerful by the 
number of protocol sessions that it can deal with, the tool has been applied to a 
large number of Internet security protocols.  
Other tools extensions are due to the fact that most group protocols include 
algebraic properties (xor, exponentiation). To our knowledge, CL-AtSe is the only 
tool for protocol analysis that simultaneously offers complete unification 
algorithms for xor and exponentiation and does not limit either terms or intruder 
operations. 
Apart from algebraic requirements, group protocols guarantee security properties 
that do not limit to secrecy or authentication properties. Unlike tools that 
exclusively verify these two properties, CL-AtSe can verify any state-based 
security property. Besides secrecy and authentication, it indeed verifies additional 
properties such as fairness and non-repudiation. 
B. Temporal requirements and verification of SGC systems 
Research papers that identified security flaws in SGC systems mostly address 
security functions without taking temporal constraints into account. Corin et al. 
[15] demonstrated that protocols with secret exchanges that had been proven 
robust and secure by time-independent analysis may be no longer robust as soon 
as time is explicitly taken into account. 
With the exponential growth of wireless networks [16], ad-hoc networks [17] [18] 
and peer to peer technology, SGC have become an extremely important and active 
research area. The complexity in these SGC stems from the addition of security 
and temporal requirement to the dynamic evolution of the groups. 
Isis [19] [20], RMP [21], Transis [22], Horus/Ensemble [20] and Totem [23] were 
the first communication systems developed with distributed group management in 
mind. They offer programmers a flexible group communication model and group 
protocols stacks. Auto-configuration was introduced in Renesse et al. [24]. Other 
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improvements include auto-adaptation, integrated security, real-time and fault-
tolerance mechanisms. Bimodal-Multicast (Gossip-based protocols) [19] and 
Springlass systems (Ensemble follow-up) include new reliability, authentication 
and delivery services to improve scalability and stability of secure group 
communication systems. Evaluation and failure identification were proposed for 
these approaches, based on formal analysis.  
Group communication systems with security services were introduced at the 
network level by the Enclave project [25] and at the middleware level by the 
Cactus environment [26]. Another avenue was opened by policy-based systems. 
For instance, the Antigone system [27] uses policies to address membership 
capabilities (e.g. control access) and security requirements (e.g. data 
confidentiality, integrity and authentication). 
Other recently published work simultaneously addresses temporal requirements 
and security constraints. Spread [23] is a group communication platform which 
offers an integrated and secure architecture for distributed client-server systems. 
Group communications are enhanced with security services without sacrificing 
the robustness and performance of the system. Spread’s layered architecture is 
based on dedicated servers implementing security services. Almeida [28] proposes 
a set of group communication protocols to satisfy real-time and dependability 
requirements, despite of some difficulties introduced by the groups’ dynamicity. 
Three different Quality of Service properties are guaranteed: timeliness, order and 
agreement. Gutierrez-Nolasco et al. [29] also explore two adaptability issues - 
namely security and synchrony of group communications systems (GCS) - to 
maintain a consistent view of dynamic groups. 
C. UML modelling of SGC systems 
UML standards and extensions are of great help for proposing methodological 
approaches that embed temporal and security requirements during the system 
design processes. 
In [30], Jürjens et al. apply a UML profile (UMLsec) to a mobile communication 
system. The authors use analysis, design and deployment diagrams. The system is 
verified against security flaws. In the paper, we propose a method centred on 
requirement capture, analysis and design. The deployment phase is not addressed. 
We map UML models into their corresponding formal representations for 
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automated verification using TURTLE and AVISPA. The result is that we check 
the security and temporal properties of the model correspondingly. This joint use 
of two formal verification tools enabled eliminating design solutions that passed 
security tests but did not meet the deadlines.  
Like Jürjens et al. [30], Morimoto et al. [31], Abie et al. [32] and Woodside et al. 
[33] extend UML with security-centric constructs. Morimoto et al. [31] promotes 
the use of patterns. In practice they detail an “authentication pattern” and its 
translation to Z, a formal language which enables formal verification. The patterns 
proposed in this paper are more general and take group management functions 
into account.  
Woodside et al. [33] discusses performances issues and therefore opens a new 
avenue for security modelling in UML. To evaluate performance and scalability, 
the SAFECAST project used an approach based on simulation with the NS1 tool. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Secure group communication systems capture complex design problems in terms 
of group management, security flaws and temporal violations detection. Some 
SGC, in particular the SAFECAST system discussed in the paper, further manage 
hierarchically organized groups. The design of such systems therefore deserves 
research investigations in rigorous development methodologies based on 
modelling techniques and formal verification tools. 
The paper proposes a UML method which covers the requirement capture, 
analysis and design steps of the design trajectory of SGCs. The requirement, 
analysis and design steps use an annotated UML to take security and temporal 
requirements into account. Formal codes amenable to the AVISPA and TURTLE 
toolkits are derived from the design models in UML. They enable early checking 
of design models against security and temporal requirements. AVISPA and 
TURTLE remain separate and so each tool explores the system’s state space 
separately. Work has still to be done for discovering problems where security and 
timing cannot be verified in sequence but in parallel. 
The proposed method was applied to the SAFECAST system. The latter was 
checked against security flaws and temporal requirements. Several security flaws 
were detected with AVISPA. The problems have been fixed and the group 
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communication protocol is now more secure. On the other hand, the system was 
investigated with two PMR radios, termed as ‘low-rate’ and ‘medium-rate’ PMR 
radios. The TURTLE toolkit proved that most temporal requirements are satisfied 
by the version based on the medium-rate PMR. Conversely, the configuration 
using a low-rate PMR violates important temporal requirements. It was decided to 
not develop it.  
The approach proposed in the paper is not restricted to the SAFECAST SGC. 
Indeed, we plan to apply our approach to validate the applicability of others 
communication architectures, such as an audio-video multicast streaming 
application within ad hoc networks. This kind of applications requires a high level 
of security, in addition to the real-time requirements, to offer the best possible 
quality of service, within constrained environment. 
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